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Abstract
This paper revisits China’s recent experiences of hosting three international mega-
events: the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games, the 2010 Shanghai World Expo and the 2010 
Guangzhou Asian Games. While maintaining a critical political economic perspective, 
this paper builds upon the literature of viewing mega-events as a societal spectacles and 
puts forward the proposition that these mega-events in China are promoted to 
facilitate capital accumulation and ensure socio-political stability for the nation’s further 
accumulation. The rhetoric of a ‘Harmonious Society’ as well as patriotic slogans are 
used as key languages of spectacles in order to create a sense of unity through the 
consumption of spectacles, and pacify social and political discontents rising out of 
economic inequalities, religious and ethnic tensions, and urban-rural divide. The 
experiences of hosting mega-events, however, have shown that the creation of a 
‘unified’, ‘harmonious’ society of spectacle is built on displacing problems rather than 
solving them.
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Between 2001 and 2004, China’s national population was captivated by the news of three 
international mega-events awarded to its major cities: the 2008 Summer Olympic Games to 
Beijing, the 2010 World Expo to Shanghai and finally  the 2010 Summer Asian Games to 
Guangzhou. Hosted by the three most influential and affluent cities in mainland China, 
these three spectacles came to dominate the top urban and regional development policy 
agendas in the coming years of preparation. This essay is largely  concerned with 
scrutinising these mega-event  spectacles, discussing what role they might have played in 
China. The essay  particularly  draws on Guy Debord’s Society of Spectacle (1967, 1988), 
and tries to reinterprete what it would mean in contemporary urban China contexts.
For many decades, mega-events such as the Olympic Games have been largely in the 
exclusive domain of cities from the developed Western world. For instance, apart from the 
three Summer Olympiads in Tokyo (1964), Mexico City  (1968) and Seoul (1988), all other 
Games until 2004 were held in Western cities. As for the World Expo that  was first held in 
London in 1851, it was also dominated by the industrial West until the 1970s, after which 
Japan and subsequently  South Korea came to host some of the latest  expositions. In line 
with the post-Fordist transition of major Western economies and the concentration of mega-
events in post-industrial cities, mega-events have been regarded as playing an instrumental 
role of spurring the consumption-based economic development (Burbank et al, 2001). This 
involved the provision of sporting complexes, convention centres, entertainment facilities 
and supporting infrastructure, while it  was hoped that the expected international recognition 
of host cities would also raise their global profile in the quest for mobile capital (Short, 
2008). Central government grants were also frequently  regarded as being a major motif 
behind mega-event  promotion by cities that experienced fiscal problems (Andranovich et  al, 
2001; Cochrane et al, 1996). 
Did China’s mega-events provide similar experiences as in the West? What would be the 
significance of these events for China? Discussions of mega-events in the developing world 
tend to focus on the role of mega-events in raising host city’s profile in international 
relations or in addressing particular agendas in national politics (for example, see Van der 
Westhuizen, 2004; Steenveld and Strelitz, 1998; Black, 2007). More socially oriented 
attentions have often highlighted detrimental impacts on the urban poor as part of 
beautification projects to transform host  cities’ urban landscape (Bhan, 2009; Greene, 2003; 
Newton, 2009). While maintaining a critical political economic perspective, this essay 
attempts to build upon the emerging literature of viewing mega-events as societal spectacles 
(see Broudehoux, 2010; Gotham 2011), and put forward the proposition that these mega-
events in China are promoted as a means to create ‘unified space’ (Debord, 1967) for the 
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purpose of both capital accumulation and socio-political stability  for further accumulation. 
This essay argues that this creation of ‘unified space’ is an attempt to pacify social and 
political discontents rising out  of economic inequalities, religious and ethnic tensions, and 
urban-rural divide. The rhetoric of ‘Harmonious Society’ and the ‘Glory of the Motherland’, 
as put  forward by the top leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, has become the key 
languages of spectacles. The experiences of hosting mega-events, however, have shown that 
the creation of a ‘unified’, ‘harmonious’ society of spectacle is built  on displacing problems 
rather than solving them.
Mega-events and China’s Cities of Spectacle
Awarding the 2008 Olympic Games host city  status to Beijing was shortly  before the 
accession of China to the World Trade Organization in September 2001. While the Olympic 
Games itself was awarded to Beijing, it was received as an award to the whole nation. In 
particular, the winning of the host city  status was a compensation for China’s previous 
dramatic loss1  to Sydney  in the bid competition for the 2000 Summer Olympiad back in 
1993. The timing of this 1993 competition could not have been worse for China, which was 
just coming out of the stand-still of economic reform policies after the violent crack-down 
on democracy movements in 1989. Its vivid memory formed the basis of many international 
human rights organisations’ fierce opposition to awarding the Olympiad to China at the 
time. 
The subsequent bid for the 2008 Summer Olympic Games came with the changing 
international atmosphere. Instead of imposing democratisation as a pre-condition of 
awarding the Games to Beijing, more support was garnered for using the Games as an 
instrument of facilitating democracy  in China (Close et  al, 2007). The experience of South 
Korea was often cited as a preceding example: it was thought that  the 1988 Seoul Olympic 
Games acted as a catalyst to South Korea’s democratisation in the mid-1980s, partly  due to 
the global pressure on the regime through its intense media exposure (Black and Bezanson, 
2004). China’s accession to the World Trade Organization in 2001 and the success of the 
2008 Olympic bid gave a further signal to the international community that China was 
becoming more integrated with the world. The results were subsequent successes with 
Shanghai’s bid for the 2010 World Exposition in December 2002 and Guangzhou’s for the 
2010 Summer Asian Games in July 2004.
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1 Beijing was leading Sydney until the third round of final voting, but lost to Sydney in the fourth round 
by meagre two votes.
China’s mega-event troika all took place during the three-year period between 2008 and 
2010: the temporal concentration of these major international mega-events in China created 
urban spectacles that went  beyond the host cities and reached the whole nation. For China, 
however, spectacles were not entirely  new in its modern era. Not so long ago in the 1960s 
and 1970s, the entire country was engulfed in the fervour of the Cultural Revolution, which 
involved popular movements and the intense mobilisation of revolutionary slogans, political 
campaigns and violence to launch a ‘class war’ against  so-called revisionists. Guy  Debord 
himself refers to China’s experience when elaborating on his discussion of the ‘concentrated 
spectacle’, which is associated with the constant  use of violence (for instance, under 
fascism) and iconic political leaders as reifications of spectacular moments (Debord, 1967).
“Its spectacle imposes an image of the good which subsumes everything that 
officially exists, an image which is usually concentrated in a single individual, the 
guarantor of the system’s totalitarian cohesion. Everyone must magically identify 
with this absolute star or disappear. This master of everyone else’s nonconsumption 
is the heroic image that disguises the absolute exploitation entailed by the system of 
primitive accumulation accelerated by terror. If the entire Chinese population has to 
study Mao to the point of identifying with Mao, this is because there is nothing else 
they can be” (Debord, 1967, p.50)
Guy Debord’s arguments about the society of spectacle suggest the rise of a society where 
the “social relation between people... is mediated by  images” (Debord, 1967, p.24) and 
where lived reality  is subordinated to and aligned with images that falsify the reality  (ibid, 
p.25). Spectacles function “as a means of unification” by creating “delusion and false 
consciousness” among otherwise isolated and separate individuals (ibid, p.24). What  is 
being created is a “type of pseudocommunity” that  conceals separation in reality  (ibid, p.
116). Debord’s subsequent  commentaries on the society  of spectacle in his 1988 publication 
argued for the qualitative transformation of the society  into that  of ‘integrated spectacle’: 
this was a dialectic synthesis of the diffuse and concentrated spectacles, with a heavier 
weight given to the more victorious ‘diffuse spectacle’ (Debord, 1988). The domination of 
‘integrated spectacle’ in late capitalist economies dictates that individual life be consumed 
by  the immense accumulation of spectacles, while the use of violent  measures is to aid the 
domination of this status quo. The use of violence as the state power is justified by the 
identification of external threats such as terrorism.
The strengthening importance of images and spectacles corresponds to the changing 
accumulation needs and strategies in contemporary cities especially in the post-industrial 
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West  (Hall, 1994). Place marketing and branding cities have come to be an important tool 
for urban development  aimed at  attracting investors and tourists (Kavaratzis and Ashworth, 
2005). The recent popularity of celebrity architects and their products for city  marketing 
could also be understood along this line (Knox, 2012). Mega-events such as the Olympic 
Games would mesh all these into an ensemble, producing spectacular images as well as 
spectacular urban spaces to meet the hosting requirements of such events and maximise 
host cities’ potential (and largely  economic) gains. Under these circumstances, mega-events 
as urban spectacles have gained an increasing degree of popularity  among urban elites as a 
means of staging cities in the world (Short, 2008).
A handful number of preceding works on mega-events resort to the use of Guy  Debord’s 
Society  of Spectacle framework. For instance, Kevin Gotham (2005, 2011) examines the 
US experiences of hosting urban festivals and world’s fair to discuss the extent to which 
mega-events that functioned as a means to conceal inherent social inequalities could also 
operate as ‘spectacles of contestation’, giving rise to the formation of resistant agendas. 
Anne-Marie Broudehoux (2007) also discusses how urban spectacles such as the Olympic 
Games accompanied the construction of spectacular monumental architecture at the expense 
of cheap migrant labour and land confiscation. Her latest work also includes the pre-
eminence of spectacular architecture, which serves the need of regulating the society 
through disseminating particular images of China (Broudehoux, 2010). The underlying 
theme of these preceding works is the extent to which spectacles play  the role of falsifying 
realities.
While it is important to understand how spectacles conceal realities and at the same time 
conceive resistance, it would also be essential to examine why  spectacles are increasingly 
sought after by China’s local and central states. One of the explanations, which this essay 
accentuates, is the spectacle’s additional function of promoting a dialectic process of (a) 
aiding the creation of a “unified space” (Debord, 1967, p.114) to enable accumulation and 
profit-led commodity production, and (b) promoting “a controlled reintegration” of isolated 
individuals to the governing system in order to address “planned needs of production and 
consumption” (in other words, accumulation needs). This reintegration is not  to salvage 
people from isolation and separation, but to bring “isolated individuals together as  isolated 
individuals”, while the isolation is filled “with the ruling images” (ibid, p.116). This 
function of spectacle as addressing accumulation needs was briefly taken up by  Julie 
Guthman (2008) in her short  editorial piece on ‘accumulation by spectacle’, regarded as one 
of the “teachable moments” that could be learnt from the observation of the Beijing 
Olympic Games.
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In this regard, this essay accentuates the spectacle’s function of aiding capital accumulation 
through the examination of China’s experiences of hosting the Olympic Games, the World 
Expo and the Asian Games. The next section discusses how the preparation for spectacles 
contributed to the accumulation needs of host  cities through spatial restructuring and 
investment in the built  environment. Then, in the ensuing section, the essay will examine 
how the sense of “pseudo-community” feeling was promoted by the state through the use of 
particular languages, which meant to create the sense of unity through the consumption of 
spectacles.
Spectacles and Accumulation
In their discussion on American cities’ experiences of hosting the Olympic Games, Burbank 
et al (2001) frame mega-events as facilitating the development of ‘consumption-oriented 
economy’, which focuses on creating places (convention centres, theme parks and sports 
complexes) for visitors’ pursuit  of pleasure. Through the deployment of regime politics that 
bring together local business interests and financially  weak local governmens, mega-events 
are thought  to contribute to the promotion of local entrepreneurial activities for the survial 
and growth of host cities in the increasingly competitive global and domestic market (ibid). 
While such propositions have some potential to explain mega-events hosted in post-
industrial cities of the West, it is questionable how they would apply  to the examination of 
mega-event experiences in rapidly industrialising emerging economies such as China. 
While local state entrepreneurialism explains the ascendancy  of major Chinese cities in the 
global market, China is also noted for its authoritarian strong state that emphasises politican 
centralisation under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party  (Wu, 2003; Chien, 
2010). In this regard, the recent experiences of hosting mega-events in China are integrated 
with China’s larger political economic projects, while the resulting place-specific 
accumulation strategies have been led by the local states under the auspices of the central 
state.
The three mega-events in China took place in three cities that had been leading China’s 
rapidly  developing economies and its regions. They also represented core industrial regional 
clusters: Beijing representing the Beijing-Tianjin-Tangshan region, Shanghai, the Yangtze 
River Delta region, and finally  Guangzhou, the Pearl River Delta region. These mega-city 
regions are the key areas for implementing China’s latest  regional development strategies 
organised by the Chinese central government. Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou, as centres 
of these mega-city  regions, are the sites of capital accumulation and the commanding centre 
of their respective regions, though the formation and development of these mega-city 
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regions may accompany continuous negotiations and territorial conflicts (Ma, 2005; Xu and 
Yeh, forthcoming). Under these circumstances, the three mega-events could be regarded as 
having presented host cities with an opportunity  to consolidate their economic and politcial 
achievements at both regional and natioal scales, while facilitating their pursuit  to become 
‘world-class’ cities in particular. To some extent, these goals tend to align with the central 
state’s national and international ambition. This would have been particularly  the case for 
Beijing and Shanghai, while for Guangzhou, the central state influence might have been 
less influential, given the regional (Asian rather than Global) scale of the mega-event itself 
and the position of Guangzhou in the national politics.2
One of the ways in which mega-events as contributing to capital accumulation could be 
seen in the promotion of fixed assets investment in host  cities through spending on urban 
infrastructure and redevelopment. Looking at  the Games finance, one of Beijing’s high 
ranking officials claimed that about 15 billion yuan were direct spending on Games-related 
venue preparation and Games operation, while 280 billion yuan were spent on infrastructure 
projects including expanding public transport networks such as new metro lines (see Shin, 
2009, p.138).3  This is almost equivalent to Beijing’s total urban fixed assets investment in 
2006 (308.6 billion yuan), and  amounts to a little less than one third (31.6 percent) of the 
total urban fixed assets investment between 2005 and 2007 when the preparation for the 
Olympics intensified (Beijing Municipal Statistics Bureau, 2011).
As for Guangzhou, the provision of its public facilities also received the greatest  emphasis. 
It  was reported that the original estimate of the Asian Games-related expenditure, as 
proclaimed by  Guangzhou Mayor Wan Qingliang, was 122.6 billion yuan: this included the 
expenditure on Games operation costs, but nearly  90 percent were reportedly invested in 
infrastructure and urban redevelopment projects. Unofficial figures speculated by  a senior 
representative at the Guangzhou People’s Congress showed an even higher estimate of 
257.7 billion yuan as the total investments to host the Asian Games spectacle (Shenzhen 
Daily, 2011; The Times of India, 2011): this was almost equivalent  to Guangzhou’s total 
urban fixed assets investment in 2009 (Guangdong Statistics Bureau, 2011). Even if we 
took the conservative figure from the government, it  again suggested that the investment in 
infrastructure and urban redevelopment was far more important than the Games itself, and 
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2 The relative importance and hierarchy of the three mega-events were also proven by the fact that the 
opening announcement for the Beijing Olympic Games and the Shanghai Expo was made by President 
Hu Jintao, while that for the Guangzhou Asian Games was given by Premier Wen Jiabao.
3 According to the International Monetary Fund’s exchange rate archives, GBP 1 was equivalent to about 
10.2224 yuan as of the end of December 2010.
assumed a substantial share in the city’s total fixed assets investment. A similar story could 
be repeated for Shanghai that reportedly  spent  about US$45 billion on preparing the city  for 
“the biggest and most expensive party” (The Guardian, 2010b).
The role of mega-events as triggering urban accumulation is further demonstrated by their 
influence on host cities’ spatial restructuring. A couple of key examples are presented here. 
In Guangzhou, the Asian Games preparation became instrumental to Guangzhou’s long-
term development goals of constructing growth centres, one of which is the Guangzhou 
New Town (hereafter GNT), located in the centre of Panyu district that received an 
increasing degree of government attention for Guangzhou’s southward expansion. The 
GNT was designated as one of the two growth cores (the other being the Tianhe New Town) 
by  the municipal government when it laid out spatial development strategic plans 
immediately  after Guangzhou’s successful bid for the Asian Games. The GNT was to be 
developed on a planned area of 30 square kilometres in the rural fringe area of Panyu 
District, adopting a ‘new town construction’ strategy. It was located about 25 kilometres to 
the south from the new central business district in the Tianhe New Town, and about  12 
kilometres southeast from the Guangzhou Higher Education Mega Center (also known as 
Guangzhou University  Town). The GNT would be regarded as one of the pivotal projects 
for the urbanisation of Panyu District. The Asian Games preparation made it possible for the 
GNT to see the first  phase of its development  through the positioning of the 2.73-square-
kilometre (nearly  equivalent to the combined size of Hyde Park and Kensington Gardens in 
London) Asian Games village in the GNTC’s north-eastern corner. The construction of the 
Asian Games village was to involve real estate projects by developers who acquired 30-year 
rights to manage facilities and sell commercial houses.
The development of the Asian Games village also testified Guangzhou’s interest in using 
metro-line development to lead urbanisation process, adopting Hong Kong’s transit-oriented 
development (Cervero and Murakami, 2009) that makes use of the combination of rail and 
property development as a means to finance infrastructure construction. You-tien Hsing in 
her discussion of new town development in Nanjing also reports a similar development 
strategy  applied there (Hsing, 2010, p.107). The municipal expropriation of farmland for 
conversion into urban construction lands accompanied the installation of infrastructure and 
public transport network such as metro connections in order to maximise development  gains 
by  attracting potential developers and incrasing land use premium. As for the construction 
of the Asian Games village, the Line No 4 connection to the village site at Haibang, Panyu 
District, was already  completed by  the end of 2006 (New Guangdong, 2006). This predated 
the actual construction of the Asian Games village, which commenced only  in mid-2008 
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(see Figure 1). In addition to this, Guangzhou invested heavily  in metro line construction, 
either new lines or existing line extensions, before the Asian Games. During the six-year 
period of preparing for the Summer Asiad, Guangzhou reportedly invested 70 billion yuan 
in metro construction, the total length of metro lines having expanded to 236 kilometres 
(People’s Daily  Online, 2010). This was a considerable increase, given the reality  that as of 
the end of 2003, few months before the city  was awarded the Asian Games, Guangzhou was 
in possession of two metro lines in operation (one of them in test running) whose combined 
line length reached only 41.6 kilometres (Guangzhou Net, 2005).4
Figure 1. Cleared sites (2008) and construction of the Asian Games village (2009) (Original 
satellite images from Google Earth)
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4 Guangzhou Net is a web site that operates as a gateway to the city information, managed by the 
Propaganda Bureau of the CPC Guangzhou Municipal Committee.
The experience of Shanghai’s selection of the World Expo site also demonstrates how the 
city strategically  set its  eyes on facilitating further redevelopment of central districts of 
Shanghai that increasingly  faced land supply constraints. The site was a waterfront area, 
located about six kilometres to the south from the Shanghai Bund. Divided into two parts by 
the Huangpu river, the site was largely  a combination of industrial and residential uses, 
having accommodated various industrial and power plants, warehouses and shipyards for 
China’s oldest shipbuilding company. The 5.28-square-kilometre planned construction area 
(1.5 times the size of New York Central Park) also included residential neighbourhoods 
whose total population reached about 18,000 households according to government sources 
(Shanghai Municipal Planning and Land Resources, 2005). In order to empty  the site for 
Expo construction, these residents were all subject to displacement from 2005 in the name 
of fulfilling public interests’ (see Figure 2 below). The latest plan for the development of 
the World Expo site was announced in March 2011, and included a combination of 
commercial, business, culture and high-end residential uses (People’s Daily Online, 2011). 
In fact, the hosting of the Shanghai World Expo enabled the city  to assemble a massive site 
for future development purposes, creating another potential growth pole in the south of 
Shanghai’s historic inner-city districts. This would lead to a substantial increase in the 
supply  of urban construction lands for development, especially when Shanghai’s total 
supply of land in 2010 reached around 8.42 square kilometres (Shanghai Daily, 2011).
Figure 2. Shanghai Expo Site’s Transition over Time: 2004 (pre-demolition), 2006 
(demolition in progress) and 2010 (completed) (Original satellite images from Google 
Earth)
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Spectacles and the Rhetoric of Harmonious Society
The social division of labour based on the concentration of the means of production in the 
hands of a few have produced isolated individuals and over time aggravated inequalities in 
sharing the outcome of social production. In order for capital accumulation to continue 
under these circumstances, social and political stability becomes a pre-condition: when 
stability is not  found, it needs to be created even by  force. This is where spectacles become 
a powerful instrument. As for China, urban spectacles came to be mobilised as a means to 
consolidate the Chinese party-state’s legitimacy  in the midst  of rising economic, political 
and social costs resulting from China’s decades-long endeavour to develop a market 
economy.
Economically, while the reform measures have resulted in the phenomenal growth of 
China’s economy  and substantially  reduced absolute poverty, aggravating income and 
wealth inequalities have come to be a major source of concern for the governments. Reports 
suggest that urban China had seen worsening income inequalities, which resulted from 
regional income dispersion as well as the large-scale unemployment from the 1990s’ 
industrial  restructuring (Meng, 2004). The country’s income disparity  as measured by the 
Gini coefficient was said to have increased from 0.33 in 1980 to 0.46 twenty  years later, 
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mainly due to the widening rural-urban income gap  (Chang, 2002).5  Inter- and intra-
regional inequalities became acute especially  from the mid-1980s when reform measures 
began to deepen (Kanbur and Zhang, 2005). Regional disparities were prominent  especially 
due to the wealth accumulated more rapidly  in eastern coastal provinces (Dunford and Li, 
2010), which benefited heavily  from the early  reform policies of ‘Get Rich First’ and the 
establishment of special economic zones. Urban areas also saw wealth accumulation at a 
much faster rate than in rural areas (ibid). The eastern coastal region therefore saw a much 
higher proportion of China’s newly  emerging super-rich than other regions: according to the 
Hurun Wealth Report for 2011, the number of China’s millionaires whose estimated assets 
worth more than RMB 10 million reached 960,000, located mostly  in the eastern region 
such as Beijing (170,000), Guangdong (157,000), Shanghai (132,000) and Zhejiang 
(126,000) (China Daily, 2011).
Politically, while calls for greater ‘rule of law’ have been mounting, the aggravating 
regional disparities are compounded by  the religious and ethnic tensions centred around the 
separatist movements in Tibet  and Xinjiang autonomous areas in particular. These areas saw 
frequent violent protests and brutal oppressions. Such tensions had been arguably caused by 
“the systemic violation of basic rights and insensitivity  toward minority identities by  the 
state”, further provoked by  the narrow range of central state responses to such ethnic and 
religious conflicts (Acharya et  al, 2010, pp.1-2). Gladney  associates the rise of ethnic 
tensions with the enactment  of “internal colonialism” that  aimed at  assimilating sub-altern 
ethnic groups in the wider project of Chinese nationalism centred on the dominant Han 
identity (Gladney, 2004). Some recent examples of heightened tensions rooted in these 
regions include the violent  conflicts that broke out in 2009 in Xinjiang, which resulted in 
the hundreds of casualties (The Guardian, 2009), and the deadly  attack in Xinjiang’s 
Kashgar shortly before the Beijing Olympic Games (Aljazeera, 2008).
Socially, the afore-mentioned urban-rural and regional disparities have come with the surge 
of rural-to-urban migration: the eastern coastal region was the overwhelmingly  popular 
destination for migrants. Remittance transfer would significantly contribute to the economy 
in their places of origin, but their lives in destination places were confronted by hardships 
and disadvantages in terms of accessing welfare and social services. Entitlements to 
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5 In terms of the ratio between the levels of disposable income enjoyed by the top 20 percent and bottom 
20 percent of income distribution based on each city’s urban household surveys, host places all 
experienced aggravating income inequalities. While comparable data are not available for Guangzhou, the 
level of income inequalities in Guangdong province as a whole rose from 3.80 in 2000 to 6.9 in 2010 
(Guangdong Statistical Bureau, 2001, 2011). During the same period, Shanghai’s income inequalities also 
rose from 2.92 to 4.17, and Beijing, from 3.09 to 3.92 (Shanghai Municipal Statistics Bureau, 2001, 2011; 
Beijing Municipal Statistics Bureau, 2001, 2011).
government services in particular had been increasingly  shaped around local citizenship, 
barring migrants as outsiders from accessing them (Smart and Smart, 2001). The 
restructuring of welfare reforms centred on the strengthening of local citizenship tends to be 
promoted actively  by  those local governments in more affluent eastern provinces. To this 
extent, the migrants’ unequal conditions in their destination places would be the reflection 
of regional disparities.
While the Beijing Olympic Games, the Shanghai World Expo and the Guangzhou Asian 
Games were aiming at  showcasing China’s economic and political power to the outside 
world, they were also orchestrated occasions for the Chinese central government to 
showcase the ‘Harmonious Society’ and the ‘Glorious Motherland’ to the domestic 
populace. As Ni Chen (2012) finds in a recent study  on how mega-events contributed to the 
branding of national images, the three mega-events were propagating messages of Chinese 
regime’s political legitimation to the domestic audience. Nicholas Dynon (2011) also finds 
in his study that  mega-events such as the Shanghai World Expo was a place-branding 
spectacle that was “tied to an ideological narrative that is concerned ultimately  not  with 
Shanghai itself but  rather with the continuing political legitimacy  of the CCP [Chinese 
Communist Party]” (p.195).
For instance, the Olympic Games slogans demonstrated how the Games were conceived in 
the domestic politics. While the proposed slogan at the time of Beijing’s bid for the 2008 
Olympiad was ‘New Beijing, Great Olympics’, the official Games slogan announced on 
26th June 2005 turned out  to be ‘One World, One Dream’ (New Guangdong, 2005). In the 
words of Liu Qi who was the President of the Beijing Organizing Committee for the Games 
of the XXIX Olympiad (hereafter BOCOG) and the former Beijing mayor, the official 
slogan “expresses the firm belief of a great nation...that is committed to peaceful 
development, a harmonious society and people’s happiness” (ibid). This corresponded to the 
statement by China’s President Hu Jintao who emphasised in February 2005 that  “it was 
important  to balance the interests between different  social groups, to avoid conflicts and to 
make sure people live safe and happy life in a politically  stable country” (China Daily, 
2005). The official Olympic slogan therefore reflected the emphasis by the top  leadership 
on the promotion of ‘Harmonious Society’ and keeping the national stability. The emphasis 
on harmonious society was also visible in the official slogan of the Guangzhou Asian 
Games, which was “Thrilling Games, Harmonious Asia”, with a slight  re-orientation 
towards Asia due to the regional scope of this mega-event. Banners and posters for event 
campaigns were deployed around Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou, carrying the slogans 
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of harmonious society, which became the guiding principle of nation-building throughout 
the period of event preparation (see Figure 3).
Figure 3. Guangzhou: “Welcome the Asian Games, Enhance Civility, Build New Styles, and 
Promote Harmony” in Guangzhou (author’s own photograph)
The event preparation in three cities were also inundated with symbols of patriotic feeling 
and nationalistic sentiments that led to the glorification of being Chinese and the 
motherland. The opening ceremonies for these mega-events, for instance, were spectacles 
that amassed a series of symbolic images and performances choreographed to deliver 
particular patriotic and nationalist messages. At the centre of this choreography  was the 
amelioration of ethnic tensions, touting ethnic harmony. The 2008 Olympic Games opening 
ceremony  depicted 2008 drummers (representing the year 2008) followed by 56 children in 
ethnic costumes to represent China’s 55 ethnic minorities and the Han ethnicity, entering the 
national stadium while collectively holding a Chinese flag. The ensuing performances 
depicted China’s imperial histories and its cultural achievements, then fast-forwarded to 
show the future aspiration of ‘One World One Dream’ with China’s astronauts circling 
around the large globe that symbolised the world. The first line of government campaign 
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slogans for the 2008 Olympic Games was “For the Glory  of the Motherland”, which came 
before the “glory of the Olympic Games” (see Figure 4).
Figure 4. Beijing: “For the Glory of the Motherland, For the Glory of the Olympic Games, 
Participating in the Olympic Games, Receiving Benefits from the Olympic 
Games” (author’s own photograph)
The 2010 Guangzhou Asian Games also exhibited a strong Chinese cultural dimensions, in 
this case, the southern China’s Lingnan culture rooted in Guangdong province. Filled with 
Chinese cultural features, the Shanghai Expo opening ceremony  also included the 
appearance of two Tibetan children who survived the April 2010 earthquake in the Tibetan 
area of Qinghai province shortly  before the World Expo opening (Xinhua News Agency, 
2010). The World Expo’s China Pavilion included exhibitions of Tibet  and Xinjiang, 
showing how the regions had developed over time under the Communist Party  rule and how 
the ethnic harmony  was being achieved (Trouillaud, 2010). It hardly portrayed any signs of 
violent  ethnic clash, which took place only a year ago in Xinjiang and resulted in the deaths 
of hundreds of protesters and the exercise of martial law.
While all the slogans, ceremonies and images to be aired throughout the country and to the 
global audience entailed a heavy  emphasis on ‘Chineseness’ and ‘Harmonious Society’, the 
actual preparations were very  much penalising certain social groups, displacing them away 
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from the host  city’s controlled urban landscape. The scale of event-related displacement  of 
local residents appeared to be phenomenal. The Geneva-based Centre on Housing Rights 
and Evictions (hereafter COHRE) reported that about 1.5 million Beijing residents would 
have been displaced during the nine years (2000 – 2008) leading up to the 2008 Olympic 
Games (COHRE, 2007). As this estimate was based on the official data from the municipal 
government, it was not likely  to include migrants. As part  of the Olympics preparation, the 
municipal government also proceeded with the redevelopment of a selected number of 
former rural villages (known as villages-in-the-city or urbanised villages), and it  was 
estimated that about 370,500 people (four-fifths of whom would be migrants) might have 
been displaced before the Olympic Games (Shin, 2009, pp.133-135). As for the Shanghai 
Expo, the construction of the Expo site resulted in the displacement of about 18,000 
households as indicated earlier, but  the municipal-wide demolition and redevelopment 
during the period leading up  to the 2010 World Expo would have resulted in a much higher 
number of people subject to relocation: In total, the official statistics report that 476,246 
households were subject to relocation between 2003 and 2010 (Shanghai Municipal 
Statistical Bureau, 2011, Table 17-7). Again, this figure would have underestimated the 
actual size of displacement, as it is likely to have excluded migrants in the estimation.
Despite the large-scale demolition and disruption to the urban social fabric in host  cities, the 
three mega-events in China were held with minimal domestic disputes, largely  aided by  the 
immense power of the local and central states in quelling protests and disturbances. The use 
of tight  security measures as well as the implementation of fast-tracked development 
projects were all carried out  by the authoritarian regime under the conditions of what 
resembles Agamben’s ‘state of exception’ (Agamben, 2003). Preventive measures such as 
detention or surveillance were taken to keep dissidents or protesters away  from event 
venues and avoid any chance of public disorder from the security  perspective (The New 
York Times, 2008; South China Morning Post, 2010). The preparation for the Beijing 
Olympic Games also accompanied a whole series of crackdown on beggars as well as 
informal traders such as street  hawkers in order to keep  the streets free of trouble and 
nuisance (The Guardian, 2008a). Beijing also kept construction sites and factories of certain 
types closed as part  of municipal attempts to ensure a certain degree of clean air quality, 
which in turn acted as a driver for migrant  construction workers’ departure during the 
Games period (The Guardian, 2008b). Strict  identity checks were carried out especially 
with regard to the presence of migrants. Environmental improvement as well as security, 
health care and sanitation were the outspoken government  claims to justify  these 
discriminatory actions. These measures of displacing local problems as a means to 
showcase the ‘harmonious’ host  city  of spectacle became precedents for Shanghai and 
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Guangzhou to follow. Reports suggest that these measures were largely replicated by  the 
Shanghai municipal government  as well as Guangdong provincial and Guangzhou 
municipal governments in their preparation for mega-events. Guangzhou also saw tightened 
security  measures during the period of hosting the 2010 Asian Games, and reportedly 
carried out  the immigration crackdown on African traders and migrants whose number 
reached somewhere between 30,000 and 100,000 (The Guardian, 2010a). Furthermore, it 
should also be noted that the heavy  dosage of patriotic sentiment  associated with these high-
profile mega-events also made it  possible for the government to win the public opinion, 
even those of negatively  affected such as migrants (Shin and Li, 2012). The control of 
media by the Chinese government to produce pro-event messages also helped to produce 
what Lenskyj (2002) refers to as ‘manufacturing consent’, which further contributed to the 
isolation of protests and disputes.
CONCLUDING DISCUSSION
The arrival of mega-event  spectacles in Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou raises the 
question of how spectacles have changed over time in China. The period of the Cultural 
Revolution that saw the domination of the ‘concentrated spectacle’ had long gone into the 
past, and the recent  history  is filled with the stories of economic success through the 
implementation of reform policies. Guy  Debord’s discussion of the society of spectacle 
reveals how urban spectacles contribute to the sustenance of capital accumulation while 
alienating people from exploitative realities. This insight allows us to vividly  capture the 
role of mega-events as spectacles in China.
China’s mega-event troika, that is the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games, the 2010 Shanghai 
World Expo and the 2010 Guangzhou Asian Games, were awarded to China at its critical 
moment of accumulation. Having been endorsed its re-integration with the world economy 
through the accession to the World Trade Organization, China embarked on a greater 
expansionary  phase of economic development to consolidate its position as the factory  of 
the world. Within China, this came with two spatial strategies. On the one hand, China’s 
expansion was accompanied by the enhancement of its production capacities through the 
promotion of heavy urban and infrastructure investments by both the central and local states 
(Harvey, 2012, pp.57-65). The expansion of state-led investment  was particularly 
pronounced at  the time of the 2008 global financial crisis, resulting in massive economic 
stimuli package. On the other hand, the economic expansion has been supported by  what 
David Harvey  coins as ‘spatial fix’, which involves geographical expansion and 
restructuring to address the inherent contradictions of capital accumulation (Harvey, 2001). 
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In China’s regional development contexts, this requires the provision of physical 
infrastructure to facilitate the movement of capital, people (migrants in particular) and 
products within the country, hence the importance of various transport- and communication-
related infrastructure (e.g. high-speed rail connection). This also raises the significance of 
investing in the central and western regions in search for addtional markets, labour and raw 
materials as well as exploiting production capacities therein.
As noted earlier in this paper, the pre-condition to this accumulation strategy  would be the 
social and political stability in these regions and in China as a whole, hence the importance 
of the promotion of Harmonious Society that comes with nationalism and Chineseness. The 
three mega-events arrived in China when the regional disparities and social inequalities 
were at their highest  after the implementation of reform policies, giving rise to various 
social and political discontents. In this regard, mega-events as spectacles aimed to ease the 
social and political tensions experienced by  the urban poor, migrants, and particularly 
ethnic groups centred around the western autonomous regions. The government emphasis 
on Harmonious Society  and its spectacular display  through the mega-event preparation and 
hosting re-iterates Guy Debord’s statement  that “The spectacle is the ruling order’s nonstop 
discourse about itself, its never-ending monologue of self-praise, its self-portrait  at the state 
of totalitarian domination of all aspects of life” (Debord, 1967, pp.29-30). The promotion of 
mega-events as spectacles have allowed the Chinese Communist Party  to enforce the 
alignment of people’s real life in line with the Party policies.
The pre-eminence of nationalism in China’s politics has led critics such as Dru Gladney  to 
speculate the possibility  of nationalism emerging as “a ‘unifying ideology’ that will prove 
more attractive than communism and more manageable than capitalism” (Gladney, 2004, p.
365). Gladney further states, “Any event, domestic or international, can be used as an 
excuse to promote nationalist  goals, the building of a new unifying ideology” (ibid). While 
the huge amount of investments for the mega-event preparation lays the foundation for 
future economic development and facilitates spatial restructuring, mega-events as spectacles 
also serve the function of bringing the national population under particular ideologies, and 
in doing so, conceal the social and political ills that the country  has been suffering from. As 
Guy Debord succinctly puts together:
“The spectacle that falsifies reality is nevertheless a real product of that reality. 
Conversely, real life is materially invaded by the contemplation of the spectacle, and 
ends up absorbing it and aligning itself with it” (Debord, 1967, p.25).
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Therefore, the mega-event troika in China could be considered as having made 
contributions to China’s accumulation by  promoting the rhetoric of Harmonious Society 
and nationalism as a unifying ideology  in order to ameliorate ethnic and regional conflicts, 
which in turn would allow the further expansion of accumulation strategies to the ethnic 
concentration regions in the central and western provinces without political conflicts. The 
central government’s efforts to implement more balanced spatial development strategies 
seem to have produced some positive results with regard to reducing regional disparities 
from the mid-2000s in particular, even though urban-rural disparities continued to increase 
(Dunford and Li, 2010; Fan and Sun, 2008). However, these spatial strategies come with 
worrying side-effects. For instance, the Go West policies in the mid-2000s to redirect state 
investments to the lagged western region resulted in the influx of the dominant  Han 
population in autonomous regions of Tibet  and Xinjiang in particular, which gave rise to 
violent  conflicts in recent years. The heavy  dosage of patriotic, nationalist sentiment to 
promote ‘One China’ as revealed in mega-event hosting could be interpreted as aiming at 
the achievement  of social stability and literally  a harmonious society  without conflictual 
tensions. These will be the basis of further capital accumulation that builds upon the 
exploitation of migrant  workers in particular and the poorer regions in the central and 
western regions that have largely  acted as the origin of human and natural resources for the 
fast-developing eastern region.
At present, it is not  very  clear whether or not the state objectives to realise uninterrupted 
accumulation as well as a harmonious society will be achieved. Guy  Debord (1967) 
highlights the dual nature of spectacle as “at once united and divided”, suggesting that  “The 
unity  of each is based on violent divisions. But when this contradiction emerges in the 
spectacle, it  is  itself contradicted by  a reversal of its meaning: the division it presents is 
unitary, while the unity  it presents is divided.” This point about spectacles as possessing 
both unitary  and divided  was taken up by Kevin Gotham (2011) who looks at the example 
of Louisiana’s hosting of the 1984 World Expo to argue that mega-events are also 
‘spectacles of contestation‘, as they  exhibit  “highly  contradictory  representations that can 
generate intense conflict  and contestation” (p.209). Unlike in the US, China’s social, 
economic and political environment  does not permit the bottom-up contestation of the 
ruling regime to blossom in the open public sphere. Nevertheless, recent  reports indicate 
various signs of organised or sporadic collective resistance, either hostile or peaceful, 
against the local states and business interests. These range from labour actions and ethnic/
rural conflicts to home-owners’ protests against polluting industries or forced evictions to 
rural villagers’ rallies against land expropriation (Perry  and Selden, 2003; Hsing and Lee, 
2010). These moments of resistance may  continue in the immediate future, given the deep 
 Page 19
societal divide that China faces. As a professor from the Renmin University  of China says, 
“China’s current success is built  on 300 million people taking advantage of 1 billion cheap 
laborers. And the unfair judicial system and the unfair distribution of wealth are making the 
challenges even greater” (The China Post, 2010).
Spectacles may contribute to the temporary concealment of societal problems, but they  are 
short of resolving such problems. While the top  party  leadership may  endeavour to address 
those sources of social and political discontents, the roots of these discontents are so much 
intertwined with the reform directions that they may not be eradicated but simply displaced 
elsewhere, as was seen in the experiences of host  cities of China’s mega-event troika. While 
Guy Debord’s formulation of integrated spectacle in contemporary  capitalist economies 
assumes ‘occult’ controlling centre that is “never to be occupied by  a known leader, or clear 
ideology” (Debord, 1988, p.9), it  is obvious to the bare eyes in China that the controlling 
centre in the country  is the Chinese Communist Party. This suggests that  while nationalism 
is clearly on the ascendency  and the Party  benefits from the increasing sentiment of 
patriotism at  present, its reputation also lies more vulnerable to degradation when social and 
political discontents further accumulate in times of economic hardship.  Therefore, the re-
emergence of the use of spectacles in China to realise state ambitions of accumulation and 
stability might  appear to be solid and well-guarded for the time being, but  along with the 
time, might turn out to have seeded greater cracks in the regulatory system.
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